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the bankruptcy filing.5 “Mere retention of estate property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition
does not violate §362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.”6
This memorandum discusses the circuit split that existed prior to the recent Supreme
Court’s decision in City of Chicago v. Fulton, and the decision itself. Additionally, this
memorandum explores what qualifies as a violation of the automatic stay and what remedies are
available to those who have suffered from a willful violation of the stay.
I.

The Automatic Stay is Not an Affirmative Turnover Obligation
A. The Circuit Split Prior to January 2021

Until January 2021, the circuits were split on whether the failure to act or return estate
property violated the automatic stay.7 The Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
supported the majority view that passive conduct violated the automatic stay because the party
was exercising control over the property by refusing to return it.8 In In re Fulton, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that Congress’s inclusion of the language “to obtain possession . . . or to
exercise control” hints that control applies to property of the estate that was not in possession of
the debtor.9 The court also noted that for §363(e) of the Bankruptcy Code to have meaning, an
asset that was possessed prior to a bankruptcy filing must be returned to the estate prior to the
creditor seeking protection of its interest.10 The court similarly found that §542(a) indicates that
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Id. at 380, 92.
Id. at 392.
7
See Practical Law Bankruptcy & Restructuring, ‘Practice Note: Splits of Authority Among
Circuit, District, and Bankruptcy Courts Tracker’ (2021) <Practical Law> accessed 7 March
2021.
8
Id. See e.g., In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019), California Emp't Dev. Dept. v. Taxel,
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the turnover of a seized asset is compulsory, and to maintain possession of the asset is a violation
of the stay.11
The minority view, held by the Third, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, maintained the use of the
word “act” in §362(a) requires an affirmative act, rather than passive retention.12 The minority
view was that failure to return property did not violate the automatic stay.13 In In re DenbyPeterson, the Third Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit’s view and looked at the ordinary
meaning of the terms “stay,” “act,” and “exercise control,” as used in §362(a)(3).14 The court
determined that §362(a)(3) prohibits creditors from taking affirmative actions to exercise control
over property of the estate after a bankruptcy filing.15 The court held that pre-petition possession
and control over a debtor’s asset does not count as a violation of the automatic stay.16
B. The Supreme Court’s Textual Analysis of §362(a)
This Circuit split was resolved by the Supreme Court in City of Chicago v. Fulton.17 The
opinion, authored by Justice Samuel Alito, made the minority view binding law.18 There, the
facts were relatively straightforward. The City of Chicago impounded the vehicles of several
individuals for failure to pay fines for vehicle infractions.19 After filing for Chapter 13
bankruptcy, each individual requested that the City return his or her vehicle.20 In each case, the
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City refused, and a bankruptcy court held that the City’s refusal violated the automatic stay.21
The City appealed in each case and the Seventh Circuit consolidated the cases for purposes of the
appeal.22 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower courts, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.23
Justice Alito’s analysis primarily focused on the language of §362(a), which suggested
that “merely retaining possession of estate property does not violate an automatic stay.”24
According to the Court’s analysis of §362(a)(3), the most natural reading of the terms “stay,”
“act,” and “exercise control” is that affirmative acts are prohibited. The Court also noted that the
term “control” can mean “to have power over,” and omissions can qualify as acts in certain
contexts.25 However, the inclusion of the word “act” in the section indicates that Congress
intended that exercising power would be an affirmative action rather than merely having a power
over something.26 This supports the reasoning that §362(a)(3) implies that “something more than
merely retaining power is required to violate the [] provision.”27
Justice Alito resolved any ambiguity in the text of §362(a)(3) in the City’s favor by
pointing to §542, which expressly governs the turnover of estate property.28 The Justice noted
that reading §362(a) to cover mere retention of property would render the central command of
§542 superfluous because §542 is intended to govern turnover of property over to the estate,
where §362 governs affirmative actions of removing property from the estate.29 Additionally,
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Justice Alito explained that §542’s carve out exception would be inoperable under a reading of
§362(a) that would command turnover of precisely what §542 excuses. The Supreme Court
concluded that retention of estate property does not violate §362(a)(3) when the property was a
collected prior to the filing of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
Justice Sonya Sotomayor concurred in the decision and rationale but wrote separately to
emphasize that the Court had “not decided whether and when §362(a)’s other provisions may
require a creditor to return a debtor’s property.”30 Additionally, Justice Sotomayor opined that
regardless of whether the City’s policy of refusing to return the impounded vehicles satisfied the
Bankruptcy Code, it “hardly comports with its spirit.”31 For a Chapter 13 bankruptcy to succeed,
the debtor must be able to continue earning an income so that the creditors can be compensated,
and for many, having a car is essential to maintaining employment.32
II.

Violations of the Automatic Stay

A violation of an automatic stay must be an affirmative action against a debtor, such as
the filing of litigation or continuing to litigate against the debtor, obtaining possession or control
over estate property, enforcing a lien against the property of the estate or debtor, and any act to
collect, recover, or assess a claim against the debtor that arose prepetition.33 Under the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Fulton, inaction, or failure to return property of the estate to the debtor that was
acquired prior to the bankruptcy filing, is not a violation of the automatic stay.34

30

Id. at 592.
Id. at 592–93.
32
Id. at 593.
33
Practical Law Bankruptcy & Restructuring and Practical Law Finance, ‘Practice Note:
Automatic Stay Overview (2021) <Practical Law> accessed 7 March 2021.
34
141 S.Ct. at 587.
31

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

To establish a prima facie case for damages due to a violation of the automatic stay, the
debtor must establish four things.35 First, that they are an “individual” rather than an entity
within the meaning of §362(k).36 Second, that the creditor received actual or constructive notice
of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition.37 Third, that the creditor intended to carry out the underlying
misconduct that violated the stay.38 Fourth, the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff to suffer a
significant resulting injury.39 Once a debtor has successfully shown they suffered an injury, the
debtor has the burden of proving the violation was willful.40
A. Willful Violations
Congress established that when a debtor’s automatic stay is violated, they are able to
recover as long as the violation is “willful.”41 Under §362(k)(1), an individual “injured by any
willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs
and attorneys’ fees, and in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”42 A
willful violation need not be an act done with specific intent, rather, a willful violation is an act
committed intentionally, with knowledge of the automatic stay.43 Violations that are sufficiently
willful include a creditor taking “questionable action despite being aware of a pending
bankruptcy proceeding.”44
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A human clerical or computer error resulting from intentional creditor action is a willful
violation of an automatic stay.45 Courts have also found that sending a billing statement to a
debtor was a willful violation of the stay.46 Initiating a collection lawsuit is also a willful
violation of the stay and can result in sanctions.47 Willfulness requires real or constructive
knowledge of a bankruptcy filing, and action on part of the creditor.48
III.

Remedies and Damages for Violations of the Automatic Stay Provisions

A debtor injured by any willful violation of the automatic stay is entitled to recover
compensatory damages, including costs and attorney's fees, injunctive and declaratory relief, and
in appropriate circumstances may recover punitive, and emotional damages.49 For example, in In
re Harrison, a lienholder willfully violated an automatic stay by taking steps to finalize a
foreclosure sale with the knowledge of the debtor’s Chapter 13 filing.50 Once the pro-se debtor
brought the issue to the Bankruptcy courts attention, the debtor was awarded to out-of-pocket
damages consisting of money it would cost to change the locks on the home and on landscaping
costs to correct issues that occurred when she was wrongly denied access to the property.51 A
homeowners’ association’s egregious violation of an automatic stay resulted in $100,000 in
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emotional distress damages and $100,000 in punitive damages, along with other compensatory
damages.52
An award of damages is not appropriate for a creditor’s willful violation of an automatic
stay if the debtor did not suffer any out-of-pocket losses or lost income.53 In In re Morgan, the
lack of evidence of a financial injury destroyed the debtor’s prima facie case of a stay violation.
“Once a willful violation of the automatic stay is demonstrated that caused harm to the debtor, an
entitlement to damages is mandatory as debtors have an ‘unequivocal statutory right’ to prove
actual damages after a willful violation of automatic stay, including the recovery of costs and
attorney's fees.”54
Conclusion
The automatic stay has a “twofold” purpose: “ (1) to protect the debtor, by stopping all
collection efforts, harassment, and foreclosure actions, thereby giving the debtor a respite from
creditors and a chance ‘to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan or simply be relieved of
the financial pressures that drove him [or her] into bankruptcy;’ and (2) to protect ‘creditors by
preventing particular creditors from acting unilaterally in self-interest to obtain payment from a
debtor to the detriment of other creditors.55 To violate the stay, the violator must have actual or
constructive knowledge of the bankruptcy petition and act anyways.56 Affirmative action, like
seizing a vehicle post-bankruptcy filing, would violate the automatic stay. In contrast, inaction,
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like retaining an impounded vehicle of a debtor that was seized prior to the bankruptcy filing,
would not violate the automatic stay.57
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City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S.Ct. at 589.
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